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Abstract—In dynamic and uncertain environments, where the
needs of security and information availability are difficult to
balance, an access control approach based on a static policy will
be suboptimal regardless of how comprehensive it is. Risk-based
approaches to access control attempt to address this problem
by allocating a limited budget to users, through which they pay
for the exceptions deemed necessary. So far the primary focus
has been on how to incorporate the notion of budget into access
control rather than what or if there is an optimal amount of
budget to allocate to users. In this paper we discuss the problems
that arise from a sub-optimal allocation of budget and introduce
a generalised characterisation of an optimal budget allocation
function that maximises organisations expected benefit in the
presence of self-interested employees and costly audit.
Keywords-Dynamic Environments, Access Control, Insider
Problem, Economics, Credence Good, Optimal Budget.
I. INTRODUCTION
Access control is challenging in an organisational setting.
On one hand employees need enough access to perform their
tasks, while on the other hand more access will bring about an
increasing risk of misuse - either intentionally, where an em-
ployee uses the access for personal benefit, or unintentionally
through carelessness, losing the information or being socially
engineered to give access to an adversary.
The approaches to access control have traditionally focused
on technological means (i.e., policy models, policy enforce-
ment and usage audit/monitoring tools) to ensure employees
cannot misuse their assigned privileges. At the core of these
approaches is the assumption that a security policy can be
specified a priori and maintained correctly. This thinking
however has led to access control systems that are too rigid and
restrictive [1], [2], [3] and fail to align the incentives of selfish
insiders [4], [5]. Problems arise because in an organization var-
ious tasks are usually performed by different individuals, each
of whom has special information (i.e., expertise) concerning
his particular sphere of activity. Usually this information is
not cheaply1 (in terms of time and effort) available to others
to correctly determine what privileges employees may need
to complete their tasks. Further, there may be divergence
of preferences between the action an employee considers
1In this paper we consider the cost to be in terms of the time of employees,
which is scarce and valuable for the organisation.
optimal and what action is optimal for the organisation. This
divergence arises because when making a decision employees
also seek to maximize their own self-interest; this becomes
particularly problematic when they draw personal benefit from
misusing the organisation’s resources.
To rectify the problem of rigidity of access control mod-
els, exception handling mechanisms are introduced to allow
employees to escalate their normal privileges. The premise is
that allowing exceptions ensures unpredicted (access) needs
are fulfilled, while through audit misuses are detected and
punished to deter the fraudulent usage of exceptions2. Al-
though in simple situation complete audit may be possible,
in which case a solution can be achieved by penalizing
dysfunctional behaviour, generally however, full observation
and verification of actions is either impossible or prohibitively
costly, especially when there is abundance of exceptions. This
contention is supported by the results of several studies [6],
[7], [8], including an empirical study of access logs of eight
Norwegian hospitals by Røstad et al., [9], [10] which report
that clinicians’ use of exceptions that can override access
requests denied by the access control system is widespread.
Indeed, they found that 74% of the staff were assigned the
permission to override denied access requests and 54% of
active health records (i.e. those accessed in a one month
period) had been accessed through the exception mechanism
[9]. They note that the sheer number of accesses via ex-
ception has made monitoring (audit) and misuse prevention
(detection) an arduous task. Moreover, even when the number
of exceptions are manageable, due to the lack of contextual
information it is very costly to establish misuses. Hence, an
unintended consequence of employing exception mechanisms
is that those staff who either maliciously or inadvertently
escalate their privileges are unlikely to be held accountable
[11], [1], [12]. The lack of accountability adversely affects
the functionality of most recent flexible authorisation models,
such as optimistic [13], risk-based [14] or break the glass [15],
which require employees performance (i.e., through actions
2Note that the inherent assumption behind the existing flexible authorisation
approaches (as well as this work) is that even though permission misuses may
be costly, a single misuse does not have a catastrophic consequence. In other
words, such works do not address authorisation in mission critical or highly
reliable systems.
and outcomes) to be auditable so that appropriate punishment
(reward) is employed as major deterrence (appeasement) of
selfish (cooperative) behaviour [5].
Our work is motivated by the problems that arise when
audit and misuse detection is either impossible or prohibitively
costly. Specifically, we assume it is often difficult, if not im-
possible, to find out (even after the fact) whether the exception
was really needed. The asymmetry of information that arises
from an inability to determine the validity of exceptions gives
employees opportunities to exploit exceptions to draw private
benefit. The problem as stated above is analogous to the subset
of frauds consumers are concerned about when purchasing
credence goods [16]. These are goods and services where the
service provider (expert) knows more about the quality the
consumer needs than consumers themselves. Examples include
services provided by mechanics, taxi drivers or doctors, where
in all cases consumers face a similar information problem.
They worry about paying for services they did not receive (e.g.,
a mechanic may fraudulently claim a part has been repaired)
or to receive goods/services they did not need in the first
place (e.g., doctors recommending unnecessary tests) [17]. In
credence goods models, customers usually try to determine
the optimal amount of service by taking into account their
information about their needs and expert’s characteristics (e.g.,
liability), rather than contracting on the service they receive.
In our setting, experts are the employees who know more
precisely whether an exception is required to complete a task
and the consumer is the organisation that due to cost (time)
constraints can neither establish ex ante nor ex post if an
exceptional access is actually needed.
In this paper we analyse the effect of costly audit on
exception misuses in organisations using a simple model with
two type of agents, supervisor and employees, both with
limited capacity (time) to perform tasks. We assume that
the supervisor is provided with incentives to always act in
the organisation’s interest, they are trusted, while employees
may have incentives to misuse the privileges assigned to
them. We further assume that the organisation has a limited
monetary resources to employ supervisors or employees and
a supervisor’s salary is higher than an employee. We then ask
the following two related questions: i) assuming the number
of employees and supervisors are fixed, given the chances of
finding out about employees fraudulent usage of exceptions
are slim (and employees know this), how many exceptions to
authorise for employees, who have vested interest in misusing
such exceptions? ii) given the organisations resources to hire
employees and supervisors is limited, what is the optimal
number of employees/supervisors to employ? Our objective
is to generalise these questions and provide the characteristics
of the optimal employment strategy and optimal allocation of
exception budget.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section
II we will provide an account of related works, focusing
on the recent risk-based access control models. Section III
provides a motivating scenario, comparing the outcome of a
rigid traditional access control with no exception mechanism
and more recent models which incorporate such a mech-
anism. We discuss the potential source of over-entitlement
and under-entitlement problems. In Section IV we extend the
motivating scenario and provide a numerical representation
of the advantages of a budget-based access control model.
Finally, Section V shows how the simple budge-based model
we proposed can be generalised and an optimal number
of employees/supervisors to employ as well as the optimal
amount of budget for employees can be determined.
II. RELATED WORKS
The MITRE Jason Report [1] notes that organisations deal
with inflexible access control systems using various ad-hoc
means such as providing near-blanket access rights or “tempo-
rary” authorisations that are never revoked. They suggest there
is a need for a parameterisable control that governs a trade-off
between security and operational needs. To address this, the
report recommends that a new authorisation model must focus
on risk and they introduce the concept of risk tokenisation,
where a token is something with exchange value that the holder
can trade for access. The tokenisation of risk allows for greater
flexibility as it allows limited access to classified information
by uncleared users when such access is so important that the
holder of a token is willing to pay the price. Following this
paradigm, several risk-based models have been proposed.
Cheng et al. [14] introduced a Risk-Adaptive Access Con-
trol (RAC) based on Bell-LaPadulla’s Multilevel Security
model (MLS) [18]. Inspired by RAC, Ni et al. [19], also
proposed a more general model to define risk based on fuzzy
inference techniques. Cheng et al., introduce a flexible gap
between allow and deny, where transactions that are denied in
the MLS model may be allowed using some additional risk
mitigation mechanisms. To quantify the risk of information
leakage, the value of information is defined to be the potential
maximum damage sustained if the information is disclosed
in an unauthorised manner. To determine the probability of
unauthorised disclosure, which requires predicting future user
behaviour, they assume in MLS such probability would be
higher when a person without security clearance is given
access to top secret information and lower if the person has
a top secret clearance. They adopt the notion of risk tokens
which token-holders can trade for extra privileges. Molloy
et al., [20] focus on how much token shall be allocated to
individuals to cap the aggregated organisational risk while
maximising information flow within an organisation. They turn
to market mechanisms and suggest that the organisation must
set up a risk token market where it releases a fixed number
of risk tokens that can be traded by users amongst themselves
using the internal currency issued to them. They assume the
information objects are accessed to produce benefits which
are enumerated in terms of the internal currency. Liu et al.
[4] attempt to reduce the risk incurred by authorised users
(insiders) who pursue risky actions (e.g., visiting malicious
websites). They propose allocating a predefined risk budget
to users for tasks they must perform and reward those who
perform their tasks while consuming less than the allocated
budget, while punishing those who exhaust their budget before
completing their tasks. In this way the cost of risky actions is
shifted from the organisation to the users. In our previous work
[21] we proposed a budget-based authorisation model where
employees had to pay not only for exceptions but for all their
resource access. We formally showed how a traditional RBAC
model can be employed as a reference point to discriminate
between users to individualise permission costs and to allocate
budget to users. We established that monitoring and analysis
of user’s budgets provides a uniform mechanism for detecting
misuses, hence reduces the administration cost. Further, there
would be an upper-bound on the damage each user can incur
to the system and as a side effect denial of service and
impersonation attacks are constrained by the users’ (finite)
budgets.
Although the above approaches provide insight into aspects
of formulating the authorisation decision as a risk management
problem, they fall short in addressing what is the optimal
amount of (risk) budget to allocate to employees. They con-
sider the risk to be the scarce resource and attempt to allow
[14] or motivate [4] employees to take risk (i.e., use excep-
tions) up to an arbitrarily adjusted threshold. Furthermore, like
the optimistic approach [13] and break-the-glass model [15],
risk-based models implicitly assume that monitoring and audit
techniques are in place to detect and punish mis-behaviour.
Hence it is unclear whether organisations still benefit from
such models when employees can be self-interested (i.e., they
will misuse their access permissions when the expected payoff
from doing so outweighs acting honestly - not misusing) and
monitoring and audit is prohibitively costly.
For example Cheng et al. [14] base the allocation of risk
tokens on a subject’s clearance level - the higher the clearance
level, the more risk tokens they receive. A problem arises when
a high clearance individual decides to misuse such privileges.
With a large allocation they can do considerable (though
bounded) damage. Further, the idea that allowing access to the
highest acceptable risk (i.e., to improve information sharing)
would imply that maximum sharing of information is an
objective for the system, while in reality, information is shared
to satisfy an objective, and when there is no known benefit in
sharing, there may not be a reason to share even if there are
no known risks.
In this work we will abstract from the proposed authorisa-
tion models and focus on the characteristics of an optimal level
of exception to authorise in a profit maximising organisation.
The existence of an optimal level of exception indicates that
even under circumstances where self-interested employees
misuses can not be detected organisations may still benefit
from the provision of limited exception privileges.
III. MOTIVATING SCENARIO
We consider a simple scenario involving the operation
of a hospital, as initially described by Røstad et al. [9] in
their field study. The hospital consists of a ward manager, a
supervisor (she), and employees (he). For now we formulate
our problem as a game between a supervisor, who is the only
delegator of permissions and has incentives to act on behalf
of the hospital’s interest (i.e., trusted and does not misuse
permissions) and employees, who on the other hand may have
private incentives to misuse the permissions assigned to them.
Each employee either requires a normal (already assigned)
permission (n) or a high permission (h) (i.e. an exception)
to complete a task, simply referred to as n or h task, e.g.,
consider an employee, Alice, who submits a print job, we refer
to the task of printing as normal (n) task if the permission
to access the printer is already assigned to Alice, otherwise
it is a high (h) task. In this regard, the high permission
does not necessarily relate to more sensitive information in
our context. The supervisor knows that there is a task to
be completed but does not know whether it is n or h. She
only knows that there is an ex ante probability of η that
the task is h and with (1 − η) probability it is n. The
employee on the other hand, being the care provider is able to
determine the type of the task with certainty. But he can either
acquire an appropriate permission to complete the task: [n|n]
or [h|h] (where | denotes conditional on needing), or he may
attempt to exploit the information asymmetry by defrauding
the supervisor through requesting [h|n] (i.e., we eliminate
[n|h] as type of exploitation). Hence forth, we assume that h is
sufficient for performing both tasks, while n is only sufficient
for normal tasks. Therefore, when an employee fraudulently
requests [h|n], he can complete the normal task and also draw
some private benefit, which makes defrauding the supervisor
an interesting option for employees.
Given the above simple scenario Table I represents the gross
utility of the supervisor based on the type of permission the
employee needed to complete a task and the permission actu-
ally allocated to him. If the permission allocated is sufficient
the supervisor receive a utility v, representing the benefit from
the completed task. Otherwise she gets 0. The inefficiencies
that we are interested in are two fold, over-entitlement and
under-entitlement. The former case is on the upper right corner
of the table. Note that over-entitlement is not detected by
the supervisor (v = v) and hence cannot be ruled out by
administering appropriate punishment for the employees who
exploit the system by fraudulently using [h|n]. The case of
under-entitlement is on the lower left corner of the table. In
reality the supervisor attempts to prevent this case, which may
translate to patients going untreated due to an employee’s
insufficient permissions. The under-entitlement problem has
been overlooked in the security and access control literature
as it primarily concerns the satisfaction of objectives other
than security, i.e., operability, usability, monetary profit.
TABLE I
GROSS UTILITY FROM DELEGATION
Supervisor’s Utility Employee needs
h n
Employee h v v
gets n 0 v
Let us now assume that β = 1/2 to be the exogenously
given probability that an employee will attempt to exploit the
information asymmetry by requesting [h|n] and (1 − β) be
the probability that he does not do so. Also assume that if
such fraudulent requests are allowed (i.e., upper right corner
of the table) the hospital incurs a cost c (even though it may
only be realised in the future). Further, consider a single time
period in which there is one supervisor who can perform only
one task and four employees, each of whom can perform
two tasks, either high or low. Hence, the set of tasks to be
performed is T = {nn, nh, hn, hh}. The ultimate objective
of the organisation is to maximise v (value from the tasks
completed, both low and high) while minimizing the cost c.
Given a traditional access control model (e.g., RBAC [22])
where no exceptions are allowed, only normal tasks can be
completed by the employees and the supervisor has time to
complete only one h task, hence the hospital draw an expected
benefit equal to 5v and four units of employees time remain
unused. However, when an exception handling mechanism
(e.g., break the glass [15]) is in place, since the exceptions
are authorised and audited later we can assume full access
is given to employees (η = 1), hence the total benefit from
completed tasks is 8v, the supervisor’s time (one unit) is
wasted while employee’s time is totally utilised. Note however,
since β = 1/2 (the chance that employees exploit their
information advantage), the organisation’s expected benefit is
8v−2c: for the employee who is performing two normal tasks
nn, the expected cost for the hospital would be 0.5c + 0.5c
(i.e., similar reasoning applies to those performing nh and
hn). Hence it can be deduced that for the exception model
to have an expected benefit the following condition must be
hold, c < 4v.
In the next section we informally introduce a budget-based
access control model and show through a limited allocation
of budget to employees the model out performs the above
mentioned models.
IV. BUDGET-BASED APPROACH
We consider a budget-based approach to access control,
in which employees must pay for h tasks (i.e., to acquire
exceptional access) through the exception budget (i.e., an
internal currency that we refer to as budget for short) b ≥ 0,
allocated to them by the supervisor. Intuitively, supervisors
may have a limited capacity (time) to perform all the h tasks
themselves, hence the options are to either forgo the potential
value (v) from completing the excess h tasks or allocate a
limited amount of budget to employees so they can complete
these tasks (i.e., [h|h]). Obviously, as stated before, by doing
this there is also a chance that employees misuse the resources
[h|n]. Hence, it is important to allocate budget to employees
such that they have only enough budget to complete h tasks
and no more (i.e., what we refer to as optimal).
Given the models introduced in the previous section, it
is simple to see that when b = 0 (i.e., employees have no
budget), the expected benefit from the budget-based model is
identical to the model where no exception is allowed, and
when b > η.T , it is identical to the model with exception
mechanism. Now assume that employees are allocated only a
limited budget, b = 1, everything else being equal the expected
benefit from employing the budget-based model, as shown in
Table II, is strictly higher than the access control model with
exception mechanism. The budget-based model also performs
better than the traditional model where no exception is al-
lowed, unless the cost of misuse c is high - precisely c > 16v.
Generally speaking, where the traditional model suffers from
under-entitlement problem (b < η.T ) and the model with
exception mechanism suffers from over-entitlement problem
(b > η.T ) the budget-based model attempts to provide just
enough budget for all h tasks to be completed (b = η.T ).
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN MODELS
Tasks No Exception With Exception With Budget
(b = 0) (b > η.T ) (b = η.T )
nn 2v 2v − 1.0c 2v − 0.5c
hn v 2v − 0.5c 2v
nh v 2v − 0.5c 2v
hh 0 2v v
By Employees 4v 8v − 2c 7v − 0.5c
By Supervisor v 0 v
Expected Benefit 5v 8v − 2c 8v − 0.5c
Given the above simple example we can observe that in
the budget-based model the decision to authorise an exception
is transformed into an optimisation problem that can be fairly
dynamic: instead of pre-allocation of rights (i.e., or risk budget
in risk-based models such as [14]) solely based on users
trustworthiness (i.e., clearance or roles) which is a common
practice, the decision is directly dependant on the factors such
as, the number of tasks to be completed, the probability that
such tasks actually require exception, the value for completing
a task, the cost of misuse, the probability of misuse and the
supervisors capacity to perform h tasks rather then delegating
them to employees. Given these factors, we can make some
general observations such as the amount of budget to be
allocated to employees must be inversely related to c, β
and the supervisor’s capacity to perform the tasks, while the
magnitude of the allocated budget is positively related to η and
v. For example, consider a hospital where four supervisors are
present instead of one that we originally assumed, in such a
case the optimal decision for the budget-based model would
be to reject all exceptions by employees and let the supervisors
to handle all h tasks (i.e., as 8v ≥ 8v − 0.5c).
We can take the analysis of the existing authorisation
policies one step further to determine the optimal one given a
situation at hand. To make the exposition more descriptive, let
us assume that supervisors will always utilise their available
time, hence in the model with exception the expected benefit
would be 9v−2c, hence the comparison of this policy with the
budget based policy becomes more interesting. In this case, by
comparing the expected benefit of each model we can make
the following policy choices:
policy =
{
No Exception if c > 6v
With Exception if c < 2/3v
With Budget if 2/3 < c < 6v
The obvious question is whether the above simple example
can be generalised such that the hiring of supervisors and
employees to be organisation’s choice: what is the optimal
number of supervisors, or employees to be hired and and
how much is the optimal exception budget to be allocated
to employees?
V. GENERALISATION
Recall that η is the probability that an employee requires
high permission (h) to complete a task. If an employee only
requires low permission but has a high permission he or she
can misuse this permission and will do so with β - a prob-
ability that captures the employees’ (behavioural) likelihood
of doing so. We assume that supervisors - for reasons of
better pay or a more elaborate selection process will never
misuse information. Let e denote the number of employees
and s to be the number of supervisors - think of these as
basic employees in a hospital and senior staff members. We
assume that employees have a capacity to perform n tasks
per period of time (month, year). The supervisor’s capacity
is σn with σ ∈ (0, 1). Services can in principle be provided
by either an employee or a supervisor. We will first assume
that the number of supervisors and employees is given and
ask how many cases can optimally be dealt with, taking into
account the risk of information misuse. This will inform us
about the maximum capacity to provide services given a set
of resources. We will next ask, what is the optimal policy if the
demand for services is given by T - in the hospital story this
could be the demand for information sensitive treatments - and
the organisation can decide about the number of employees
and supervisors it wants to hire. In this case we assume the
employee’s wage is 1 and the supervisors wage is w > 1, to
allow for a wage differential.
A. Optimal high permission budget
For notation, let H be a random variable that denote the
number of tasks that require h permission, and b be the
budget for h permissions an employee holds, then the expected
number of misuse cases by employee given a budget allocated
to them, denoted by µ(b) is as follows:
µ(b) = βPr(b > H)E(b−H|b > H).
Given the binomial nature of this problem, we can numer-
ically determine this value as
µ(b) = β(
b−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
ηi(1− η)n−i)(b− i)).
The expected number of tasks that can be completed by one
employee given he has b budget to access h data is equal to:
t(b) = Pr(H ≤ b)n+ Pr(H > b)(E(n−H|b > H) + b).
or
t(b) = (n− b)
b∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
ηi(1− η)n−i +
b+
n∑
i=b+1
(
n
i
)
ηi(1− η)n−i)(n− i).
In words, if H ≤ b then an employee can serve all jobs, if
H > b he can perform b task requiring h permission and the
expected number of tasks out of n that require low access. In
any case, the number of cases a supervisor can do is σn, he
or she can either pick up cases not done by employees or do
extra cases.
Let us assume the value of a case served is v and the cost of
a case of data misuse is c, then determining the optimal amount
of budget to allocate to employees in order to maximise the
profit to the firm is given as:
max
b
(sσn+ et(b))v − eµ(b)c.
Given the discrete nature of this problem, a solution can
always be determined numerically. t(b) is weakly increasing
in b, for small b the number of cases increases by one for
each increase in b, for large b this constraint is not binding in
expectation and t(b) stays constant in bµ(b) and is increasing
in b with µ(b = 0) = 0 and µ(b = n) = β(n − ηn). This
implies that if v < µ(1)c = nη(1−η)n−1c the optimal policy
is not to provide any h access to employees and if Pr(H =
n)v > (µ(b = n) − µ(b = n − 1))c the optimal policy is to
provide full access to all employees.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the question of optimal budget
allocation in the emerging budget-based access control models.
We showed that a static budget allocation, that is solely based
on employees trustworthiness and organisation’s risk appetite
may lead to over-entitlement or under-entitlement problems.
We established that the allocation of budget must be context
dependant: employees are only provided with exception budget
if there are not enough (trusted) supervisors to perform the
tasks that require exception and the expected benefit from
authorising exception (to complete tasks) out weights the
expected cost of employees’ permission misuse. We proposed
a generalised budget allocation function and showed that given
the context information it is always numerically possible to
determine the optimal budget.
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